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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IS ALIVE
AND KICKING IN NEW JERSEY TIDALWATERS:
NEPTUNE CITY v. AVON-BY-THE-SEAA CASE OF HAPPY ATAVISM?
LEONARD R. JAFFEE*

INTRODUCTION
In the 1821 case of Arnold v. Mundy, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that the American Revolution had vested inalienably and
indefeasibly in the state's people the legal title and the usufruct in
New Jersey's tidalwater resources. As legal representative of New
Jersey's citizenry, the state's legislature might "lawfully erect ports,
harbours, basins, docks, and wharves on the coasts of the sea and in
the arms thereof ... bank off those waters and reclaim the land upon

the shores.., build dams, locks, and bridges for the improvement of
the navigation and the ease of passage ...

clear and improve fishing

places, to increase the product of the fishery ... create, enlarge and
improve oyster beds. .

. ."'

But these legislative powers could be

exercised only as by a sovereign, "for the common benefit of every
individual citizen." 2
A trespass action founded on a claim of private oyster fishery,
answered with a claim of public right, was responsible for this holding.3 But the decision had the potential to determine every conceivable state-law tidalwater resource allocation question.4 New Jersey
citizens, qua citizens, would have been assured standing to seek judicial protection against even legislatively authorized tidalwater pollution.' A century of post-Arnold decisional law acquiescing in legislative and private derogation of common tidalwater resource rights,
however, abated the impact of that case. By early summer of 1972,
*Assistant Professor, University of Louisville, School of Law.
1. 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2, 12. See Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting GreatwaterResource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 571, 651-52 (1971) (Jaffee) [herein-

after cited as Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev.].
4. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 655-56, 669-72, 687-88.
5. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 688, 89. In a riparian system like New Jersey's, all
water resource allocation powers stem from waterbed property. Id. at 687 nn. 764 & 765. If
full equitable title to a state's tidalwater beds vests inalienably in all her citizens as individual cotenants, those citizens logically should be the ultimate arbiters of tidalwater resource
allocation in that state. See also Paterson v. E. Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J.Eq. 49, at 62-66, 70
A. 472 at 479-80 (Ch. 1908), aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 588, 78 A. 1134 (E.&A. 1910). See
generally, Note, Jaffee, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 576-89.
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legal and equitable tidalwater resource title had, practically, been
squeezed from the citizenry. 6
On July 24, 1973, however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey

reinstated the rule of Arnold, in a seashore recreation right action
brought by the Borough of Neptune City and two of its private
residents, challenging the Borough of Avon-By-The Sea's seashore-

access fee discrimination against non-Avonites. This case, Neptune
City v. Avon-By-The-Sea, 6A holds that the public trust doctrine prohibits the state and its subdivisions from discriminating among New
Jersey citizens in foreshore access regulations.

Neptune City recognizes and assures a citizen recreation right re-

specting foreshore. 7

The decision apparently also secures citizen

access to foreshore at points of intersection with dedicated public
ways.' Moreover, Neptune City suggests: (a) that the public may
have rights of wetbeach access over private drybeach, as well as usufructuary rights respecting wetbeach allocated to private possession; 9
(b) that no person or branch of state government can abridge citizen
navigation, fishery, recreation, access and water purity interests;'
and (c) that New Jersey citizens have standing to challenge private

and state-government threats to such tidalwater interests.' 1
This comment will develop these points with respect to three ques-

tions: (1) citizen rights and standing to assert public tidalwater rights
as against government regulation or private claims, (2) the impact of
Neptune City on present tidalwater resource allocation, and (3) the
need for legislative organization of (a) tidalwater resource use and of
(b) citizen access to judicial and administrative forums for tidalwater
resource allocation regulation.
CITIZEN RIGHTS AND STANDING TO SUE

The Neptune City plaintiffs' claims were (a) denial of equal pro6. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 656-94.
6A. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972), rev'g, 114 N.J. Super. 115, 274 A.2d 860 (Law
Div. 1971).
7. Accord, Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 179, 185, 186-87 (1972).
8. See 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54-55. Compare Hoboken Land Imp. Co. v. City of
Hoboken, 36 N.J.L. 540 (E. & A. 1873). See generally, Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 663-65,
citing, inter alia, Louisville & N.R.R. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N.E. 983 (1970),
Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. v. People ex rel. Dailey, 222 Ill 427, 78 N.E. 790 (1906), and People
ex rel Burton v. Corn Products Refining Co., 286 111.226, 121 N.E. 574 (1918). See also
Jersey City v. Hall, 79 N.J.L. 559, 76 A. 1058 (E.&A. 1910); Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 179,
180, 185-88 (1972).
9. See 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54-55; id. at 305, 294 A.2d at 56 (dissenting opinion);
26 Rutgers L. Rev. 184-88.
10. See 61 N.J. at 304, 294 A.2d at 55; 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 181-83.
11. Two private citizens remained joined as plaintiffs at the determination of Neptune
City. This remarkable fact and other aspects of the case suggesting citizen standing are
developed below.

July 19741]

PUBLIC TR USTDOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY

tection and (b) infringement of common law public sea access
rights.1 The equal protection claim could have explained the continued joinder of private citizen plaintiffs, but would have said nothing about whether the citizenry has cognizable interests in tidalwater
resource allocation generally. A successful suit by private citizens
claiming municipal infringement of their common law sea-access interests, however, could have implied citizen standing to challenge
either state-government misallocation or private appropriation of
tidalwater resources. An enforceable common law claim respecting
realty implies property in the claimant. Of course, the implication
could also be either legislative (or constitutional) limitation on local
government action, or state-government consent to be sued.
The trial court decision, while rejecting the equal protection claim,
contraindicated citizen standing on a common law sea-access right.
Under Schultz v. Wilson,' ' the legislature, as presumptive fee simple
owner of all lands under the state's tidalwaters, might deny the entire
citizenry all tidalwater resource uses and, under proper circumstances, discriminate in their allocation.' a Since the legislature authorized municipalities to impose beach use tolls, the question in
Neptune City was not whether Avon-By-The-Sea could levy such
tolls on Neptune City residents, but solely whether the fourteenth
amendment of the federal Constitution permitted the burden to fall
more heavily on non-Avon residents than on Avonites.' I Being
rationally related to the borough's beach and boardwalk maintenance
and safety burdens, Avon's
toll discrimination did not offend the
1
equal protection clause. 6
The supreme court reversed, but eschewed decision on fourteenth
amendment grounds. Under the public trust doctrine's guarantee of a
"deeply inherent"' I right in state citizens to the benefits of tidalwater resources, "municipalities may not discriminate in any respect
between their residents and nonresidents."' I Moreover, "the public
trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be
open to all on equal terms ... and ... any contrary state or municipal
action is impermissible." 1 9
The supreme court relied heavily on Arnold's language indicating
12. 61 N.J. at 300,
13. 44 N.J. Super.
A.2d 395 (1957).
14. 114 N.J. Super.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 120, 274
17. 61 N.J. at 303,
18. Id. at 304, 294
19. Id. at 304, 294

294 A.2d at 51.
591, 131 A.2d 415 (App. Div. 1957), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133
115,118,274 A.2d 860,863 (Law Div. 1971).
A.2d at 864-65.
294 A.2d at 53.
A.2d at 55.
A.2d at 54.
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each individual New Jersey citizen has an undivided claim in rem,
good even against legislative impairment. It also approved Arnold's
statement that not even "sovereign power" can make "a direct and
absolute grant" of the waters of the state, "divesting all the citizens
of their common right.""0 Therefore, since the individual plaintiffs
remained joined in the supreme court process, Neptune City implies
(a) that neither state government nor private entity may divest state
citizens of their public trust rights in tidalwater resources, and (b)
that no person may claim, nor arm of government grant him, a
greater share of the benefit of this trust than every New Jersey
citizen can claim.
Since the supreme court chose to enforce the latter of these rules
in the face of legislation which did not expressly authorize discriminatory beach use fees, it appears the court will enforce directly individual citizens' substantive public trust claims, albeit relevant legislative statements are absent or contrary. 2 1 Arnold and Neptune City
permit legislation licensing, leasing or conditionally granting possession of parcels of foreshore, ocean beach or tidalwater bedlands, if
consistent with the public interest.2 2 Such an allocation would not
favor the grantee over other citizens, but choose him as the mechanism of an enhancement of the common benefit.2 I But, any tidal20. Id. at 302, 294 A.2d at 52-53.
21. The Neptune City court's choice is inconsistent with traditional indirection methods
of securing public interests, methods like statutory construction contraindicating concentrated administrative or municipal allocations, as discussed in Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471
(1970). See also infra notes 50-53 and surrounding text. This implies the court is willing to
protect citizen tidalwater resource interests as substantive, not procedural, rights. New
Jersey courts had refused to recognize any rights against legislative preferences in tidalwater
resource allocation, not in municipalities (as government subdivisions or corporate entities)
or in individual state citizens or riparian proprietors. For example, the Attorney General ex rel.
Simmons v. Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (E. & A. 1900), the court held that
the relator-complainant New Jersey citizen riparians had no rights in the tidalwaters of the
Passaic River entitling them to personal or proprietary protection against legislatively-sanctioned water pollution by upstream municipalities. Accord, e.g., Belleville v. City of Orange,
70 N.J. Eq. 244, 62 A. 331 (Ch. 1905). This holding assumes that tidalwaters and their beds
and foreshore bear only generalized public interests titled in the legislature, rather like
ordinary public domain or unallocated tax money. Neptune City obliterates these premises.
Similarly, Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (E. & A. 1917),
which held owners of land abutting tidalwater remediless against legislatively authorized
water pollution injurious to their aesthetic and recreational interests, would be susceptible
of severe limitation or overruling under Neptune City. Neptune City would protect such
landowners against unwarranted or discriminatory impairment of such interests. CJ' Arnold
v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
22. Id. at 301-03, 294 A.2d at 52-54.
23. See id. at 302, 294 A.2d at 53, citing, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. at 78. See also
Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892), cited in Avon in 61 N.J. at 300-01,
294 A.2d at 51-52; Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 694-710, cited in part in Avon in 61 N.J. at 303,
294 A.2d at 55. Quaere, however, whether such a grant may be unconditonal, whether its
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water resource allocation or claim that impairs or does not supply
the common interest of the state's citizens would be a discrimination
violating the public trust and would be actionable by any injured
Cases in other jurisdictions have assumed similar
state citizen.2
common property and citizen standing. 2 s Legislation in other states
has given citizens power to seek judicial remedies for water resource
allocation problems. 2 6 But a statutory grant of power to sue on
behalf of the public does not ensure future state citizens standing;
this depends on a cognizable claim of the plaintiff that a judicially
protectable interest has been injured or is threatened by the defendant. Repeal would remove any protection not premised on property
or common law personal rights. 2
extinguishment (effect on improvement takings or devaluations aside) may be compensable?
See id. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54; Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Note, 25
Rutgers L. Rev. at 710 N.904 and references there cited.
24. Since the citizen's common law right under the public trust doctrine is unsusceptible
of legislative impairment, his standing to challenge private or government tidalwater resource abuses should be secure against aught but constitutional alteration or federal navigation servitude assertion. Even state constitutional changes seem doubtful, because Arnold
treated the public trust as beyond even sovereign infringement. 6 N.J.L. at 78, quoted in
Neptune City, 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 53. Indeed, no single generation of citizens ought
to be able to diminish the public trust, any more than might a life tenant waste land
improvements in which the remainderman is interested. Cf. Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 596-99
and notes thereto. See also Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 453-57; Priewe v.
Wisconsin State Land & Imp. Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896). "Injury" doubtless
ought to be a jurisdictional question. But it should be provable by a demonstration of
impairment of interest in fact. Compare Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167-78 (opinion of
Brennan and White, JJ.) with Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea and Crescent Park Tenants'
Assoc. v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 275 A.2d 433 (1971). Since under Neptune
New Jersey citizens hold individuated equitable property in tidalwater resources, quaere
whether even injury in fact would be prerequisite to standing in an injunction action against,
e.g., tideland alienation legislation, tidalwater pollution authorization, or overregulation of
common tidalwater resource use. Cf., e.g., Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194
(1913); and compare Attorney General ex rel. Simmons v. Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 385,45 A.
995 (E. & A. 1900) (if injunction much greater hardship to defendant and public than
benefit to proprietor plaintiff, plaintiff to be remitted to remedy in damages, which, absent
injury, should be awarded nominally to stay prescription).
25. See Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 878 (1970); Baker v. Voss, 217 Wis. 415, 259 N.W. 413 (1935); cf. Priewe v. Wisconsin
State Land & Imp. Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
26. See generally McLennan, State Legislation to Grant Standing: Questions, Answers

and Alternatives, 2 Environmental Law 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited as McLennan].
27. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 691.1201 et seq. (1972) grants power (not standing in the
strict sense) inter alia to "any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or
other legal entity [to] maintain an action ... for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources and the public trust therein .. " The problem is the content of the
"public trust:" Does it contain inalienable, indefeasible individuated citizen property as
suggested by Arnold v. Mundy and Neptune City? Florida Stat. Ann. § 403.412 (1973) is
substantially identical. Wisconsin, the only riparian state besides post-Neptune City New
Jersey recognizing individuated citizen public trust property, may have legislation permitting public nuisance suits not predicated on special damages. Assembly Bill 879, Wis. 1971.
See 2 McLennan at 322. The Wisconsin bill was premised in part on a public trust in

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 14

NEPTUNE CITY AND CURRENT TIDALWATER RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS

A. Foreshore Use and Access
Arnold v. Mundy holds that the American Revolution gave to the
people of New Jersey all lands under tidalwater within the state's
boundaries. It follows that no prerevolution private allocation of

tidelands or foreshore can have defeated the tidelands and foreshore
interests of New Jersey's citizenry. Therefore, under Arnold, the
postrevolution legislature held in public trust all unappropriated tidelands and foreshore title within the state, as well as title to the public
interests if not the legal title in privately appropriated tidelands and
foreshore. Since the power of the legislature to delegate its tidelands
and foreshore improvement functions2 ' to municipalities and private
proprietors is circumscribed by the public trust doctrine's protection
of common tidalwater-resource rights of the citizenry,2 9 the legislature cannot authorize land development
inconsistent with public
3
trust interests like tidalwater access. 0
The New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals once nearly so held,
navigable water. Since the Wisconsin citizenry have long had individually assertable equities
in navigable waters, the Wisconsin bill contemplates establishing merely a mechanism of
remedy, not creating a rescindable power. Moreover, since the bill precludes money damages
only against the state, it allows damages actions against private claims and injuries, as should
the rule of Neptune City. For nearly three years, New Jersey's legislature has been considering legislation respecting citizen suits to protect the state's environment. E.g., S. 973 (1971);
Assembly 1268 (1971); Assembly 569 (1972). A 1970 bill contemplated a three-judge
environmental protection court with original, appellate, and general jurisdiction, presided
over by lawyer-judges with ten or more years membership in the New Jersey Bar, S. 868
(1970), not carried into 1972-73 sessions. The appropriateness of such a court was noted in
Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 571, 703-05, 708-09 (1971), and will be discussed further, below,
vis-a-vis Neptune City and the need for economist and scientist judges.
Though its biophysical, economic, and technological aspects are beyond the scope of this
commentary's analysis, the plan of New Jersey's Environmental Protection agency, to reclaim private-appropriated tidemarsh and resell it to increase the state's school fund, see
N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1973, at 1, col. 2, ought to be noted as a problem requiring the
consideration of an environmental court. Much of the tidemarsh in question may have been
essential, in its natural state, to full-scale ocean fishery reproduction, perhaps soon to be a
critical element of world food supply. But some may not be renaturalizable. Thus the public
trust doctrine may require that some such reclamation be for reallocation to natural use, not
for capitalization of the school fund, a purpose outside the public trust except in situations
like those cited in Arnold v. Mundy. See text accompanying note 1, supra; infra notes
119-22 and accompanying text. The present mechanism for testing projects like this tidemarsh reallocation plan, judicial review of partly discretionary agency action, appears to
continue to be awkward if not incompetent as an instrument of the public trust doctrine.
See opinion of Justice Hall, dissenting in N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 61
N.J. 1,292 A.2d 545 (1972).
28. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30. See 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54. See also id. at 305, 294 A.2d at 56-57 (dissenting
opinion).
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in Hoboken Land Improvement Co. v. Hoboken. 3 That case involved the question of whether the statute incorporating defendant
land company, which granted defendant some foreshore, extinguished a pre-existing dedicated public water access easement. 2 The
incorporating act's foreshore grant, when read most favorably to the
public interest, was legally consistent with a public water access easement. Hence, the easement would extend over the defendant's foreshore when filled. 3 Public tidalwater access could not have been cut
had expressed such intent in
off by the granting act unless the statute
'
"clear and unequivocal language."

3

The public tidalwater access

route was an implied extension of a dedicated street abutting defendant's foreshore.
Faced with a similar problem in the 19 10 case of Jersey City v.
Hall,3 the Court of Errors and Appeals seemed to say that no
legislative or municipal act could cut off public access to tidalwaters. 6 The specific holding there, however, was that the tideland
grants in question did not divest Jersey City of municipal jurisdiction
to regulate access and use of the affected tidalwater basin. Hall does
not, apparently, preclude limited allocations of foreshore to exclusive private use. Rather, Hall insinuates that the public trust doctrine
prohibits substantial interference with public access to tidalwaters or
obstruction of established entrances (like those naturally connecting
3
3
with dedicated roads or streets). 1 Neptune City seems to agree . 8
Absolute power to cut off citizen foreshore access by realty grant,
or to plan roads not to connect with foreshore, then, cannot, consistently with this public trust doctrine, vest in any branch or arm of the
government of New Jersey. One may, accordingly, expect that tres31. 36 N.J.L. 540 (E. & A. 1873). Cf. Jersey City v. Hall, 79 N.J.L. 559, 76 A. 1058 (E.
& A. 1910).
32. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 663-65.
33. Id., nn. 579-80 and accompanying text.
34. 36 N.J.L. at 552. This was because the foreshore fee grant was an act of legislature as
proprietor conveying "proprietary title," while legal title to the public easement inhered in
the legislature as sovereign; a grant of proprietary title "will never operate as a release or
extinguishment of a sovereign right not necessarily included within the scope of the grant."
Id. at 551.
35. 79 N.J.L. 559, 76 A. 1058 (E. & A. 1910).
36. Id. at 564, 76 A. at 1062. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 669-72.
37. Compare Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 630-43, and 665 n. 593, citing, e.g., Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Cincinnati, 76 Ohio St. 481, 81 N.E. 983 (1970). See Illinois Central R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. at 187 nn. 49-50 and accompanying
text.
38. See 61 N.J. at 304, 294 A.2d at 55, citing State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore.
584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969), quoting Arnold v. Mundy, and indicating that the incidence and
contours of the public trust depend on current citizenry demand. See also id. at 305-06, 294
A.2d at 56-57 (dissenting opinion); Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. at 186-88.
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pass actions will not lie against New Jersey citizens who, without
injuring improvements, traverse upland beach abutting a public road
or street to reach foreshore. Condemnation of upland improvements
obstructing foreshore access from public roads should be available to
municipalities and county governments."
Citizen suits to enjoin
construction or compel removal of such obstructions to tidalwater
access extensions of public roads and streets are far from inconceivable. 4 0

B. Water Recreation and the Fishery: Water Impurity and Other
Impediments
1. Vis-A-Vis Citizen Interests Generally
Classically, the public trust doctrine gave the citizenry a navigation
easement, a fishery and attendant foreshore rights like mooring.41
Neptune City recognizes that "It]he public trust doctrine, like all
common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but
should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and
needs of the public it was created to benefit." 4 2 Under Neptune
City, the public trust comprehends recreational
rights like "[sea]
43
bathing, swimming and other shore activities."
The doctrine also protects New Jersey citizens against economic
and probably other nonphysical, as well as physical, impairments of
their tidalwater resource interests. 4 4 It is likely that pollution degradation of aesthetic or recreational tidalwater boating and bathing
39. See Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 187-88 n. 54. Cf. 72 C.J.S. Private Roads § § 1-6;
Note, 19 Ore. L. Rev. 171 n. 1 (1940). See also Allen v. Stevens, 29 N.J.L. 509 (E. & A.
1861).
40. Compare State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969) (private
fence obstructing ocean beach access), cited in, Neptune City, 61 NJ. at 304, 294 A.2d at
55. Cf., e.g., suits to establish ways by necessity as discussed in Oregon Mesabi Corp. v. D.
Johnson Lumber Corp., 166 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1947), Marinclin v. Uling, 262 F. Supp. 733
(W.D. Pa. 1967), and Flora Logging Co. v. Boeing, 43 F.2d 145 (D. Ore. 1930). In areas
where no public roads run perpendicular to wetbeach, public necessity should support
fixing a public way across private drybeach at points most compatable with both public and
private interests. The necessity of the public access route implies the drybeach owner has
been permitted invalidly to impair the public trust. Thus, again, condemnation of the
easement should be required; the public necessity would have been the result of a severance
of an estate, and the accommodation of public and private interests would minimize losses
to the drybeach proprietor, who should be compensated for improvements losses he could
not have foreseen. Cf., e.g., Finn v. Williams, 376 M11.
95, 33 N.E.2d 226 (1941). Note that
prescription will not lie against the public trust. See infra note 56.
41. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 576-649.
42. 61 N.J. at 303-04, 294 A.2d at 54-55, citing, e.g., Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 608 n.

226,690, 701.
43. Id. But compare Blundell v. Cateral, 5 B.&Ald. 368, 106 Eng. Rep. 1190 (K.B.
1821), discussed in Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 599-613.
44. Accord, Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. at 183.
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interests, pollution injury to the common piscary, and pollution
endangerment to tidalwater bathers are actionable under Neptune
City.4 Accordingly, municipal and industrial tidalwater polluters
may not retain this doctrinal shelter from injunction which they have
enjoyed for over seventy years. 4 6 Wharf-out, tideland and foreshore
fill and dock improvement developments that have been taken for
granted since 1850 (when Gough v. Bell4 " held owners of upland
adjacent to tidalwaters had a license to fill and wharf-out onto foreshore and tidelands which became irrevocable when exercised) 4 8
may now be susceptible to citizen public trust doctrine actions
against interference with common boating and fishing rights.4 9
In any case, administrative or legislative determinations respecting
the propriety of a concentrated tidalwater resource use, like a wharf
or a sewage usufruct, will probably be accorded some respect: Neptune City sanctioned reasonable, nondiscriminatory beach use fees.
But legislative and administrative tidalwater resource allocations will
no longer be effectively conclusive: Neptune City questioned
whether many such allocations were valid or absolute and overturned
an access toll ordinance on public trust doctrine grounds, albeit the
enabling act could have been construed' 0 as prohibiting the ordinance.'
Judicial intervention in great-water resource allocation
fields occupied by legislative or administrative action is likely to
remain cautious, however.' 2 Courts lack technical expertise, and a
particular challenged legislative or administrative scheme may not
appear sufficiently unreasonable to justify intervention by a court
with a crowded docket.' 3 But in the areas of noncitizen and extraterritorial use, immediate judicial consideration may be appropriate.
45. See 61 N.J. at 304, 294 A.2d at 55, citing, inter alia, Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at
690,701, which argues for a citizen's antipollution right incident to the common piscary.
46. Compare Attorney General ex rel. Simmons v. Paterson, 58 N.J. Eq. 1, 42 A. 995
(Ch. 1899), rev'd, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (E. & A. 1900); Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev.
683-89. See also Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 A. 379 (E. & A.
1917).
47. 21 N.J.L. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1847), after new trial, 22 N.J.L. 441 (Sup. Ct. 1850),aff'd,
23 N.J.L. 624 (E. & A. 1852).
48. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 657-63.
49. Seeid. at573,690,701.
50. See also Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 184-85.
51. Compare Bailey v. Driscoll, 19 N.J. 363, 117 A.2d 265 (1955), rev'g in part,aff'g in
part, 34 N.J. Super. 228, 112 A.2d 3 (App. Div.) (administrative tidelands grant to be
redrafted in light of narrow reading of authorizing act). See generally, Sax, The Public Trust
Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471
(1970).
52. See N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1, 292 A.2d 545

(1972).
53. See supra note 27 and infra notes 113-35 and surrounding text.
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2. Extraterritorialor Noncitizen Appropriation
Arnold v. Mundy' ' held that tidalwater resource interests (there
an oystery) were the property of the people of New Jersey. Neptune
City seems to accord, and even pre-Neptune City cases that gave the

legislature absolute regulatory power respecting such resources view
those interests as property of the state as sovereign.' s Accordingly,
tidalwater resource interests are the property, not mere privileges, of
New Jersey's citizenry. It follows, respecting any such property
vested exclusively in New Jersey citizens, that even governmentauthorized noncitizen or extraterritorial use or enjoyment may be
disallowed by the public trust doctrine, which, under Arnold v.
Mundy, prohibits private claims and government alienations impairing the tidalwater interests of any New Jersey citizen.5 6

These observations, however, raise two questions: (1) What precisely is the subject of the public trust? (2) Which elements may
inhere exclusively in New Jersey citizens?
Arnold v. Mundy and Neptune City admit that the public trust
doctrine allows alienation of possessory interests and some usufructs
in tidalwater resources. For example, sale of a fee in some foreshore
to a shipping company could further a purpose of the trust, develop-

ment of water commerce.5

'

Moreover, a sale of some foreshore or a

leasing of an exclusive fishery might not violate the public trust, even
if it affords the citizenry no immediate benefit, provided the grant is
either defeasible upon assertion of superior citizen claim or not inconsistent with current common use.' 8 Public trust rights are not
static possessory claims. They are protean usufructuary interests
54. 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
55. E.g., Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (E. & A. 1870); Ross v.
Mayor of Edgewater, 115 N.J.L. 477, 180 A. 866 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 447,
184 A. 810 (E. & A. 1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 543 (1936); see Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev.
657-76. McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525, 61 A. 710 (Ch. 1905),
affl'd, 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489 (E. & A. 1906), affl'd, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), held, inter
alia, that the state, being lowest riparian and water bed owner along New Jersey streams,
could claim a paramount right to natural flow against diversions by upper riparians, bed
owners, and strangers.
56. Estoppel, laches, prescription, and adverse possession appear irrelevant because
Arnold v. Mundy held such property inalienable and immutable. Cf., e.g., Arnold v. Mundy,
6 N.J.L. 1, 81 (Sup. Ct. 1821); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441 at 461 (Sup. Ct. 1850); Cross v.
Morristown, 18 N.J. Eq. 305 (Ch. 1867), approved in Jersey City v. Hall, 79 N.J.L. 559 at
573-74, 76 A. 1058 at 1063 (E. & A. 1910). Accord, O'Neill v. State Hwy. Dept., 50 N.J.
307, 235 A.2d 1 (1967). See also Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 661 n. 567.
57. See Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78; Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. at 452.
Similarly, some private trustees may sell portions of the corpus to supply increased benefits
intended by or consistent with the instrument of trust. See also Cunningham & Tischler,
Dedication of Land in New Jersey, 15 Rutgers L. Rev. 377 (1961) respecting the somewhat
different law on reallocation of land dedicated and devoted to public uses.
58. See 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54-55.
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respecting tidalwater flow, purity and access, tidelands and foreshore
use and tidalwater fishery maintenance and consumption.' '

Some of these interests are peculiar to the citizens of New Jersey,
others shared by federal citizens. Fast fisheries, oysteries, clam fish-

eries and the like, may be entirely the property of New Jersians,
because the res is not naturally in interstate commerce. 6 0 Foreshore
and tidelands are similar, but the fee and the usufructs in these res
are limited by the federal navigation servitude. 6 ' Interests like the

right of natural flow 6 2 are also tributaries to the navigation servitude. The commerce clause may not prevent New Jersey from hoard-

ing its streamwater against private noncitizen or sister state extraterritorial diversion. 6 ' But flow changes incident to navigation
servitude exercises may not be (compensible) takings of public trust

property. 6 4 Finally, the floating or free fishery, at least in coastal
and interstate tidalwaters, is either the property of federal citizens or
a privilege of New Jersey citizens equally shared by sister state resi-

dents (under article IV, section 26
Federal Constitution),

5

or the commerce clause 6 6 of the

Fast inland tidalwater fisheries, inland tidalwater floating fisheries
and intrastate tidal stream flow are protected by statute in New

Jersey.6 7 But at least two statutes permit diversion of fast and floating tidalwater fishery resources and tidal streamwaters by noncitizens

or to other states. 6 8 These statutes pose two problems: (A) Does the
federal Constitution require New Jersey to share this wealth with

other states and their citizens? (B) If not, do these statutes benefit
New Jersey's citizenry sufficiently to justify their otherwise misallo-

cative abuse of the public trust?
Professor Charles Corker has suggested 6

may have contraindicated

9

the commerce clause

the decision in McCarter v. Hudson

County Water Company,7" that New Jersey had power to "insist
59. See id.
60. Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (shrimp fishery in coastal waters)
with McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (fast fishery in inland waters).
61. See, e.g., 2 Waters and Water Rights § § 100-105 (Clark ed. 1967).
62. See generally Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 621
(1968).
63. McCarter v. Hudson County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525, 61 A. 710 (Ch. 1905),aff'd,
70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489 (E. & A. 1906), aff'd, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
64. See 2 Waters and Water Rights § § 101.3-101.4, especially § 101.4.
65. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
66. Id.; cf. 2 Waters and Water Rights § § 131.6-132 (Clark ed. 1967).
67. See generally title 23 N.J. Stat. Ann. (1940 and Supp. 1972-73); N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 58:2-1 through § 58:3-1 (1966).
68. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:34 (Supp. 1972-73) and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:3-1 (1966).
69. Waters and Water Rights § 132 (Clark ed. 1967).
70. 209 U.S. 349 (1908), aff'g on other grounds, 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489 (E. & A.
1906), aff'g on yet different grounds, 70 N.J. Eq. 525, 61 A. 710 (Ch. 1905).
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that its natural advantages," including its streamwaters, remain
within its borders for use by its citizens."' In McCarter,the problem
was, inter alia, the constitutionality of a statute limiting extraterritorial pipe or ditch diversion of streamwaters. 7 2 Professor Corker questions whether Arizona v. California,7 which held that Congress
could apportion Colorado River waters among the states interested in
the river by a legislative plan conflicting with the laws of those states,
disallows state rules that repel noncitizen users or preclude extraterritorial diversion. 4
But the Colorado River naturally supplied each party state. Moreover, Congress' plan merely provided a more efficient mechanism for
allocating Colorado River water use than the disparate system the
states had employed.
Many New Jersey streams and surface water systems, the Mullica,
Great Egg Harbor, Rathway, and Manasquan, for example, however,
flow solely through New Jersey. The states adjacent to New Jersey
are not naturally benefited by such waters. Therefore, they cannot
claim use rights like those inhering in the Colorado River system
states, rights necessary to Congress' Colorado River plan. The Mullica
River is "interstate" in that it connects with the Atlantic Ocean. But,
since that river does not flow through any other state, no other state
can claim consumptive5 interests in it under any riparian or prior7
appropriation theory.
Professor Corker also suggests that if McCarter or New Jersey
legislation precludes exporting bottled water from New Jersey, it has
been overruled by City of Altus v. Carr.76 Altus held, inter alia, that
Texas' legislature could not prohibit production of private groundwater for interstate commerce, when Texas law otherwise allowed
private groundwater to be bottled and sold.
But, under New Jersey law 7 ' legal title to land under tidalwaters,
including tidelands and foreshore, vests in the state as trustee for its
citizens.7 I Ownership of land under water carries title to all state-law
71. 209 U.S. at 357 (per Justice Holmes for the Court).
72. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:3-1 (1966).
73. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
74. 2 Waters and Water Rights 323-24 (Clark ed. 1967).
75. To the extent, however, sister states or the nation may be interested in flowage into
the ocean (or more realistically the quality of Mullica waters emptying into the Atlantic),
other states or the federal government may have standing to contest New Jersey regulations
bearing on Mullica River use.
76. 385 U.S. 35 (1966y), aff'g per curiarn, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (threejudge court).

77. As Professor Corker knows, see 2 Waters and Water Rights § 131.6 at 319 (Clark ed.
1967).
78. Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821); see, e.g., Stevens v. Paterson & Newark
R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (E. & A. 1870); Schultz v. Wilson, 44 N.J. Super. 591, 131 A.2d 415
(App. Div.), cert. denied, 24 N.J. 546, 133 A.2d 395 (1957).
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interests in the waters above. 7 9 In the riparian system, as developed
in New Jersey, lower riparians or bed owners are protected against
unreasonable consumptive diversions by upstream bed or ripa
owners. Nonriparian diversion or commercial exportation is per se
unreasonable," 0 and the lower owner (the state is the lowest in New
Jersey) may absolutely prohibit diversions from above his stream bed
or from beside his ripa (depending upon whether ripa ownership in
8
fact carries streambed title). 1
Since the groundwater in Altus was the property of a private
person not limited by a Texas common law diversion limitation like
New Jersey's, the Texas statute precluding exportation could unduly
burden interstate commerce . 8 2 McCarter is, therefore, distinguishable
from Altus. 8 The commerce clause does not require goods or land
profits to be shipped in interstate commerce. That is what the
Supreme Court meant when it held in McCarter that New Jersey
"may prefer its own inhabitants in the enjoyment of its products,
even when the effect of its law is to keep property within its boundaries ..... "8 The product New Jersey would keep within its boundaries is the property of the state and all its individual citizens. The
groundwater owner in Altus could likewise have refused to sell his
water to the exporter there.
Of course, McCarter does not permit New Jersey to prevent noncitizen or for-exportation diversions from interstate waters running
through or adjacent to its territory where the point of diversion is in
another state or where (as with the Delaware) the river is a boundary.
Also, Congress may sanction changes in the level of New Jersey
streams partaking of interstate water systems for the purpose of
improving navigability.8 New Jersey and her citizenry have the
property otherwise to prevent nonriparian diversion and commercial
exportation of tidalwaters contained naturally within the state.
Before the promulgation of the Constitution, the government of
79. E.g., Paterson v. E. Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49 at 55-57, 70 A. 472 at 478-80
(Ch. 1908), aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 588, 78 A. 1134 (E. & A. 1910); see McCarter v. Hudson
County Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 695, 65 A. 489, aff'g, 70 N.J. Eq. 525, 61 A. 710; Sayre v.
Newark, 60 N.J. Eq. 361,45 A. 985 (E.& A. 1900).
80. See Hanks, The Law of Water in New Jersey, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 621, 649-67 (1968).
81. See Paterson v. E. Jersey Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49 at 56-57, 70 A. 472 at 479-80
(Ch. 1908),aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 588,78 A. 1134 (E. & A. 1910).
82. Compare Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821) (legal and equitable title
vested in citizenry of New Jersey by the Revolution) with Martin v. Waddell 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367 (1842), Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Barney v.
Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876) (states determine greatwater resource allocation).
83. Compare Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) with McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S.
391 (1876).
84. 209 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added).
85. E.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co. 324 U.S. 499 (1945). See 2 Waters and
Water Rights § § 100.1-101.5 (Clark ed. 1967).
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sovereign New Jersey held title to the state's tidalwater interests for
the benefit of its citizenry, present and future. The state could not
have transferred this trust to the federal government for the national
benefit, as it had surrendered many of its sovereign powers in assenting to the Constitution. The tidalwater resource interests recognized
in Arnold v. Mundy were and remain inalienable. These premises are
not limited to the field of water diversion.
As was suggested above, the fast fishery in intrastate New Jersey
tidalwaters is wholly the property of the state's citizenry. 8 6 But the
floating fishery in inland tidwalwaters may be the interest of all
federal citizens and susceptible of Congressional regulation.
As between the state, or its citizens qua citizens, and freshwater
riparians, the fishery in tidal streambeds should be treated like that
in fresh streamwaters. Freshwater riparians should not be entitled to
take fish from waters flowing past their banks in such quantities as
would deprive the lower owners, New Jersey and the rest of her
citizens, of their natural, reasonable fishery enjoyment. 8 '
Some tidal stream floating fisheries, however, may supply interstate or coastal piscaries. To the extent of such connection, the rule
of Toomer v. Witsell 8 8 probably applies. In Toomer, the coastal
shrimp fishery was held to be a federal interest protected against
state taxation favoring the citizens of the taxing jurisdiction.
As profits a prendre, however, tidalwater floating fishery resources
unconnected with interstate or coastal waters should be property of
the state citizenry, free of federal claims. Moreover, the commerce
clause ought never apply where a floating fishery cannot legitimately
be treated as a usufruct like the flowing water, rather than as a profit
of the streambed soil.
Since her intrastate tidal stream flowage and tidalwater fast fisheries are exclusively New Jersey's interests, the public trust doctrine
of Arnold v. Mundy and Neptune City precludes their allocation to
noncitizen use, unless her citizenry will thereby benefit more than by
retention of their enjoyment. Because once consumed free fish are
unredeemable, prudence indicates treating the free fishery as state
citizenry property, and leaving to a federal court challenge by foreign
citizenry the question of the validity of legislation prohibiting noncitizen appropriation. 8 9
86. Compare McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) with Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L.
1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
87. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 582-87. Compare Hanks, The Law of Water in New
Jersey, 22 Rutgers L. Rev. 621, 649-99 (1968). Cf. Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369 (Sup.

Ct. 1867).

88. 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
89. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (migratory birds).
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New Jersey legislation prohibits extraterritorial streamwater diversion except by consent of the Water Policy and Supply Council. 9 0 If
consent is granted, diversion is permitted up to 100 gallons daily per
person for each municipality supplied with fees charged for diversions exceeding that rate, 9 1 unless the Council finds such schedule
impracticable. 9 2
This scheme is problematic. It sets a flat rate and equates money
compensation with flowage conservation. This does not directly serve
the public trust, but threatens it. The excess diversion fees could
mediately benefit citizenry tidalwater resource interests, as by helping to pay water purification costs. But current legislation does not
contemplate such a use of the fees. The 100 gallon limit could be
damaging in dry periods. Moreover, the fees may not inhibit waternecessitous foreign communities whose dry-period demands would
likely be paralleled by affected New Jersey communities. Problems,
as the effects of such diversions on the tidalwater fishery, are not
considered by the legislative scheme, and all of these problems are
left to the virtually uncheckable quasi-legislative discretion of the
Council.9 ' Consequently, New Jersey's water use permit system
raises some substantial public trust doctrine questions.
Legislation 9 allowing noncitizen appropriation of tidalwater fishery resources, however, may afford New Jersey's citizenry benefits
that tend to offset resource losses. Sport fishing, like other seashore
recreation, is a considerable revenue source in New Jersey. 9 s
Seasonal noncitizen angling as presently regulated 9 6 threatens
neither to extinguish the tidalwater fishery nor to dampen citizenangler shore use. Foreign fish-harvesting firms may employ New
Jersians, and their operations may supply some of the state's food
demand. Since the fishery, unlike other tidalwater resources, is valuable principally as a consumer or commercial resource, moneylicensed nonresident appropriations and citizen uses may accomplish
the same allocations.
90. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:3-1 (1966).
91. N.J.Stat.Ann. § § 58:3-1(b),58:2-1 (1966).

92. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:3-1(b)(1966).
93. Whether foreign communities will succeed in making damaging dry-period diversions
may depend solely on the foresight, diligence, or procedures of the Council. Compare infra
notes 114-32 and accompanying text. Moreover, the council, not having been charged to
,consider the tidalwater fishery in consenting to or allowing continuance of a foreign diversion, may not do so. The effects on the fishery may seldom be significant. But they are
legitimate property concerns of New Jersey's citizenry.

94. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:3-4 (Supp. 1973).
95. The following analysis applies in many respects to nonresident wetbeach use.
96. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § § 23:3-1, 23:3-4, 23:3-11, 23:3-57, 23:5-1 through 23:5-17
(Supp. 1973).
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Thus, noncitizen appropriation of tidalwater fishery resources
requires policing not prohibition, and this has been provided for. It
appears that Neptune City and Arnold v. Mundy would support a
citizen suit to enjoin exclusive commercial appropriations of tidalwater fishery resources by noncitizens or foreign firms; but the point
is presently academic, since the legislature has outlawed nonresident
net fishing.9"
USE REGULATION, MAINTENANCE COSTS, AND CITIZEN SUITS
The primary impact of Neptune City, opening New Jersey's entire
wetbeach resource to equal use by all New Jersians, threatens as well
as benefits common foreshore interests. Previous to Neptune City
some New Jersians might have been deprived of seashore recreation
in desirable areas because access was burdened by high tolls or exclusive private use of the wetbeach. Now many New Jersey citizens may
be denied recreational use of some of the state's seashore because
overuse may destroy or substantially degrade the res or its enjoyment
potential.
Some of Neptune City's mediate ramifications seem similarly
problematic. Uncertainty respecting the existence of public equitable
interests in dry-beach estates 9 8 and treacherous difficulties in the
administration of citizen suits,9 for example, are not unlikely sideeffects of Neptune City.
A. Citizen Use Regulation and Resource Maintenance Costs
The Neptune City court "fully appreciate[d] the burdens, financial and otherwise, resting upon ... oceanfront municipalities by
reason of the attraction of the sea and their beaches ... to large
numbers of people not permanently resident in the community." 1 00
The entire court agreed that municipalities, under existing enabling
legislation, may impose reasonable, nondiscriminatory beach-use
fees, and "in arriving at such fees, consider all additional costs legitimately attributable to the operation and maintenance of the beachfront, including direct beach operational expenses, additional personnel and services required in the entire community, debt service of
outstanding obligations incurred for beach improvement and preservation, and a reasonable annual reserve designed to meet expected
future capital expenses therefor."' ' 0 1 The majority also suggested
97. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:5-24.7 (Supp. 1973).
98. See 61 N.J. at 305-06, 294 A.2d at 56-57 (dissenting opinion).
99. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 703-05.
100. 61 N.J. at 304, 294 A.2d at 55.
101. 61 N.J. at 305, 294 A.2d at 56 (emphasis added).
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that oceanfront municipalities "may ...regulate and limit, on a first

come, first served basis, the number of persons allowed on the beach
at any one time in the interest of safety. "' 0 2

"Additional" costs presumably means expenses related to nonresident summer influx and beach use. But under the court's antidiscrimination public trust doctrine ruling, an oceanfront municipality's
expenses attributable to nonresident use and user servicing may not
be shifted to nonresident users in the form of disproportionate user
fees. Hence, in order not to expose its residents to tax costs unrelated to their enjoyment or explainable only by nonresident use and
service enjoyment, oceanfront municipalities may create nondiscriminatory beach access fee schedules reflecting the entire cost of beach
use and maintenance and other burdens cited in Neptune City. Such
fee scheduling would charge beach-use-related costs to beach users
only, seemingly a most equitable solution. But the per capita incidence would probably often be exorbitant, and even prohibitive to
many of the same nonresidents the Neptune City court sought to
protect. Low income nonresidents may not be able to afford the fees
as well as transportation expenses, itinerant lodging, and other awayfrom-home maintenance costs. This effect could be heightened by
such ordinarily innocent, trivial restrictions, as municipal regulations
respecting offbeach dress. Should such fee schedules be disallowed as
effectively discriminatory contra the public trust doctrine, oceanfront community residents could suffer the unequal money burdens
suggested above. The lopsided tax effect of such a rule might be
offset somewhat by the commercial benefits oceanfront communities
specially derive from nonresident tourism. Local regulation poses
organizational problems also.
In an article discussing some organizational problems Wisconsin
suffered under localized boating regulations, 1 0 Richard Cutler, a
member of Wisconsin's Southern Regional Planning Commission,
illustrated how the various self-serving boating regulations of many
Wisconsin communities had, inter alia, prevented intercommunity
boating.1
Cutler's well-argued suggestion was exclusive state-level
control.
Municipal regulation of ocean beach use creates similar organizational problems. For example, local first-come-first-served entry
regulation allows local residents an access advantage incident to their
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. Cutler, Chaos or Uniformity in Boating Regulations? The State as Trustee of Navigable Waters, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 311 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Cutler].
104. See Cutler, 314-20. Many Wisconsin lakes as well as navigable streams border on
several municipalities.
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choice of home situs. Local beach use regulation and maintenance,
however, involves resource allocation problems touching conservation interests too.
Sea bathers, fishers, boaters, anglers, and oceanbeach sunbathers
tend to congregate in municipal jurisdictions organized to service
them. Such communities have neither the desire nor the power to
rationalize res use distribution by spreading the incidence evenly over
the New Jersey coast. Indeed, Neptune City's ruling, that local communities may regulate the number of persons allowed on beaches "in
the interest of safety," sanctions such misallocation. If the use limit
in a given municipality is determined solely by safety requirements,
many more individuals than indicated by state-wide conservation and
recreation use diffusion interests may continue to congregate in a
few "resort" areas. The result of continued local control qualified by
Neptune City could well be continued allocation inefficiency vis-a-vis
both individual use maximization and resource conservation, as well
as further disutility in public recreation oriented tidelands resource
development.
Neptune City indicates residential communities up-and-downbeach of, say, Atlantic City will see many newcomers to adjacent
tidelands. But the res may not be prepared, even if nearby communities adjust to the nonexclusivity imposed by Neptune City. Any
comparatively isolated New Jersey wetbeach may not see any or
additional recreational use, either because most nonlocal citizens are
more attracted to built-up and "resort" areas or because the res has
been rendered unfit for diffuse recreational use.
Some beach use problems (conflicts between sea-bathing and surfangling, for example) may be susceptible of rational local solution.
But, local communities will rarely have legitimate paramount seashore interests, and local controls will always threaten extramunicipal organizational problems. As Cutler suggested,' 05 the type of
administrative scheme Michigan devised to regulate boating is the
best for all similar water resource related public recreation fields. The
Michigan Boating Act of 1962' 06 provides for state-wide rules, but
allows municipal participation'

0'

in rulemaking.'

8 State control

may, however, involve some pitfalls.
If only state funds pay the costs involved, local residents and
communities could reap small windfalls in employment (local resi105. Cutler, 320-21.

106. Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1286(1) through § 18.1286(32) (1963).

107. Via petition to the State Boating Committee, see Mich. Stat. Ann. § 18.1286(la)

(1963).
108. See Cutler, at 320.
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dents likely would dominate beach service employment), commerce,
and superior local citizen use privileges, financed partly by nonresident or nonuser taxes. But some safeguards may be available.
A state agency with branches could issue limited-period licenses,
while charging, or authorizing municipalities to charge, on-location
access and use tolls scheduled by the state agency. Under this system,
local residents and nonresident citizens would be on an equal footing
vis-a-vis access. Licenses available to all citizens on a first come first
served basis could authorize use of a certain seashore area without
regard to the applicant's place of residence or could guarantee
nonresident citizens access-for-a-fee in a given locality during a specified time-period. The allocation could be by beach sector, not municipal jurisdiction, to assure that no particular beach area would be
relatively overused. Access 4nd use rates could be scheduled to fit
low-income citizen pocketbooks, and development and maintenance
costs slack would be taken up by state tax revenues. Accordingly, the
skewing of seashore recreation cost tax burdens among citizens
should be minimized, while access and use rates would not be prohibitive for low-income inland citizens.
Local community employment and commerce advantages inhering
in a state-level system are largely incidental to the location choices of
citizens generally. Thus, perhaps they are not properly treated as
system problems.
Commerce and employment advantages are also local expense factors. The Neptune City court recognized the legitimacy of an oceanfront community's consideration of such costs in its entrance fee
rate-setting.' 0 Cost "misallocation" in this area, though probably
fluctuating from year to year, would be slight. Further it would be
diffused more by state government administration than by a local
system under which a few local communities or taxpayers would
bear the costs of benefits potentially accruing to many nonresidents
or non-taxpayers.
One systems conversion matter also deserves mention. The state
should assume those current debts seashore communities have incurred in financing beach preservation and bathing facilities improvement' ' o that promise future benefits. The state should appropriate
to a central agency directed to supply seashore resource conservation
and recreation user service any reserves local governments have established for expenses' '.related to similar utilities. ' 2
109. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. Public seashore areas should be treated
like state parks.
110. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
112. Compensation for state government confiscation of local property is not a question
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B. Citizen Suits
If the public trust doctrine of Neptune City and Arnold v.
Mundy' 1 I gives New Jersey citizens the benefit of a judicial remedy

for misallocation of tidalwater resources, it also portends headaches
for New Jersey's court system and for the state as an economic
entity. Under the present court system, the economic, technological
and biophysical questions inhering in most important tidalwater re-

source allocation problems often would be beyond the fact-finding
competence of trial judges.' I4 Moreover, state economic and resource development programs as well as private entrepreneurial

operations affecting tidalwater resources would share a new risk, the
possibility of abortion by citizen suit.' 15
here. See Note, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1083 at 1088-91, 1106-20 (1967). Space limitations
contraindicate further development of this theme or schemes respecting other problems in
this field, like surf-angling regulation. See, however, e.g., Comment, 1959 Wis. L. Rev. 117
(1959). See also, e.g., White v. Hughes, 190 So. 446 (Fla. 1939). It should be noted here,
however, that New Jersey's present water diversion permit system, see supra notes 69-85,
90-93 and surrounding text, invites reconsideration vis-a-vis preferences among citizens as
well as respecting extraterritorial and noncitizen diversions. Certain of present fishery use
regulations affecting inland intrastate tidalwaters, like N.J. Stat. Ann. § § 23:5-24.2 and
23:9-76.1 (Supp. 1973) should also be noted here. These statutes appear to allow commercial net-fishing in tidalwaters subject to the public trust interests of New Jersey's citizenry.
Some permit net-fishing only during a few months of each year and impose substantial fines
for some violations. If the proceeds of conviction are put toward restocking, compare N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 23:10-19 with § 23:3-11 (Supp. 1973), a public trust violation would be hard
to argue. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:9-76.1 (Supp. 1973) seems to authorize stationary commercial fishing operations, though this inference is not necessary. Apparently the "fishery"
operation contemplated is taxed, perhaps meaning licensed, and possibly the proceeds are
applied toward restocking. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 23:5-24.2 (Supp. 1973) provides for paid
net-fishing licenses, the proceeds to go partly toward restocking. Its fee schedule is, arguably, low, and the limitations it contemplates, net-type and (time and place) use restrictions
rather than catch size limits, allow administrative error. But in principle the statute comports with the public trust doctrine.
113. 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
114. The author has discussed this problem before. See Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 694-95,
703-10, especially notes 875-81, which would have been drafted with great deference to
Professor Coase had it been done at the time of this writing. The author has come to
understand that Professor Coase's propositions do indicate proper, long-range solutions to
all public trust impairment problems. The author has seen that where greatwater pollution
substantially impairs the common interest the polluter's long-range cost contraindicates the
pollution for reasons that are reflected in reasons why the social interest indicates cessation
of the pollution. The author cannot devote space here to a detailed explanation. But he
would appreciate the reader's noting an editing error in note 880 of the aforementioned
article: line 26 reads "not injure the polluters. . ." but ought to read "not benefit the
polluters .. "
115. State legislative programs, of course, would not often fall under citizen litigational
attack, since the judiciary would justifiably shrink from invalidating under the public trust
doctrine any but outrageous violations, like those in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387 (1892) and Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land Imp. Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918
(1886). Compare dissenting opinion of Justice Hall, New Jersey Sports Exposition Auth. v.
McCrane, 61 N.J. 1,292 A.2d 545 (1972)and Neptune City v. Avon-By-The-Sea,61 N.J. 296,
294 A.2d 545 (1972) (per Hall, J.) with In re Environmental Hearings on Proposed Sports

July 19741

PUBLIC TRUSTDOCTRINE IN NEW JERSEY

New Jersey Assembly bill No. 569 (1972) contemplates citizen
suits to protect the state's environment.' 16 The bill provides that a
Complex in the Hackensack Meadowlands, 62 N.J. 248, 300 A.2d 337 (1973) (Hall, J.
concurring in the result). Nevertheless, there is real potential for invalidation of administrative
or legislative schemes like those tested in the Sports Complex cases above,
116. "... [A] ny person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other
legal entity may maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction where the alleged
violation occurred or is likely to occur... against the State, any political subdivision... instrumentality or agency of the State or of a political subdivision ... any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity for the protection of the
air, water and other natural resources and the interest of the public therein from pollution,
"
impairment or destruction of the environment or any part thereof..
Revisionary note: Since the final draft of this article was written, two events have occurred relevant to this note and its accompanying text. First, Assembly #569 (1972) failed.
Second, the New Jersey legislature has begun considering two new environmental rights
bills, as well as a proposed resolution that would add to the state's constitution an environmental rights amendment.
The two new bills, Senate #873 (1974) and Assembly #1245 (1974), introduced as this
article went to press, appear to narrow the field of litigational action that would have been
available to New Jersey citizens, under #569. In defining the available remedies, both
provide:
In any action ... where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing
that... the defendant has, or is likely to pollute ... the defendant may
rebut ... by the submission of ... evidence of compliance ... in good faith
with any pollution abatement schedule entered into by the defendant with the
Department of Environmental Protection, the purpose of which is the alleviation of the damage ... complained of. The defendant may also show ... that
there is no feasible and prudent alternative to defendant's conduct and that
such conduct is consistent with the promotion of the public health, safety,
and welfare in light of the State's paramount concern for the protection of the
environment....
This language allows aesthetic degradation. It may also allow some damage to wetlands and
their fish spawning functions so long as existing, human health, safety, or welfare interests
are not immediately injured or threatened with necessarily deleterious long-range consequences. Assembly #569 did not express such limitations, and did not imply the aesthetic
one.
Otherwise the two new bills are substantially old hat respecting substantive concerns,
except for one minor conflict between them. Senate #873 incorporates the rule de minimis,
while Assembly #1245, which once contained it, was amended not to include it, suggesting
that causes that might have been maintainable only at law for nominal damages may support
injunctions. This is not irrational, where a pollution threat, though far away, is likely to
grow. The two bills also contain some confusing language which could lead the unwary
reader to believe citizen environmental protection suits would be available only to enforce
statutes, ordinances, or administrative rules prohibiting environment-threatening action. But
the bills really intend no such limitation and ought to be rewritten so as to make this clear.
The proposed constitutional amendment, Assembly Concurrent Resolution #107, reads:
Each person has the right to live in a healthful environment, free from
pollution and waste in all forms. Each person may enforce this right against
any party through appropriatelegal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulationas the Legislature may provide. ... [Emphasis added.]
This language seems riddled with holes. For example, the words "healthful" and "forms" in
the first sentence allow that pollution is actionable only where it substantially threatens
human health. This possible limitation compares with that of Senate #873. Similarly,
"waste" may not be actionable unless substantial, because all forms and not all degrees
make causes of action. This reading allows, for example, piecemeal destruction of New
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court trying such a suit may defer to an appropriate state agency for

findings of fact, retaining, however, jurisdiction over questions of
fact and law.' 1 7 But an appropriate agency may not always be available, and the restraint of the judiciary contraindicates meaningful
review of agency fact-findings.

Consider, for example, the recent sports complex cases.'

1 8

The

question was the propriety of building a huge sports complex in
tidalmarshlands which may be critical estuarine areas vis-a-vis ocean
fish spawning. In his partial dissent in the first case, Justice Hall
criticized the lower court for assuming that funnelling proceeds from
the project into New Jersey's school fund' .9 would satisfy the releJersey's meadowlands, which have supplied much of the North Atlantic's ocean fisheries.
Further, the word "appropriate" in the second sentence allows courts to continue: (a) to
apply liberally the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (b) to refuse to question legislative
action; and (c) to "balance the conveniences," in equitable actions, to the detriment of
environment-protecting plaintiffs and either remit them to meaningless or absent legal remedies or dismiss with prejudice their actions. The language, "subject to reasonable limitation
and regulation" by the legislature, seems to allow New Jersey's legislature to withdraw its
actions or programs from liability by regulating-out or limiting-out remedies. It is logical
that whoever or whatever has the power to limit or regulate liability is beyond the ambit of
the substance or causes of action subject to such limits or regulation, as a set defines its
members. The legislature could be limitable or regulable only for the reason that it acted
unreasonably in regulating or limiting individual, government agency, or government subdivision liability. Further, that a nonreviewability provision in an environment-threatening
legislative program may be "unreasonable," seems to imply merely that the specific program
may have no rational foundation in social fact or public purpose. Both of these are due
process matters, rarely arguable, and extrinsic to the field of substantive environmental
rights. Indeed, the words "reasonable limitation" could even permit the legislature to preclude suits against selected forms of private conduct, given the elasticity of "reasonableness"
and the principal meanings of "limit" or "limitation" (boundary, restriction, or circumscription). Such a limitation could relate to an otherwise proper legislative plan that incidentally
requires immunity for certain private conduct or persons.
The new bills and constitutional amendment, then, would not make positive changes in
the situation discussed in this article. If anything, they underscore the reform suggestions
this article made before they were proposed.
117. "If administrative or other proceedings are required or available to determine the
legality of the defendant's conduct, the court may remit the parties to such proceedings .... " "... In so remitting the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action pending
completion thereof for the purpose of determining whether adequate protection from such
pollution, impairment or destruction has been afforded.
...In such adjudication the court may order that additional evidence be taken to the
extent necessary to protect the rights recognized in this act .. "
Two new bills, Senate #873 (1974) and Assembly #1245 (1974) displaced Assembly
#569 (1970) as this article went into print. They are substantially identical to #569
respecting the provisions quoted in this footnote, however.
118. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane,61 N.J. 1,292 A.2d 545 (1972);Inre
Environmental Hearings on Proposed Sports Complex in the Hackensack Meadowlands, 62
N.J. 348, 300 A.2d 337 (1973).
119. Consideration from grants of tideland interests is dedicated to the Fund for Support
of Free Public Schools by N.J. Const. art. 8, § 4, 2 and N.J. Stat. Ann. § § 18A: 56-3, 6
(1968).
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vant requirements of the public trust.' 2 0 Justice Hall, who wrote the
majority opinion in Neptune City, noted that, although each was a
"public purpose," neither land sports recreation nor support of public schools supplies a goal contemplated by the public trust doctrine.' 21 The public trust doctrine requires a common water interest-related public purpose which tends to diffuse and enhance, rather
than concentrate and impair, the citizenry's beneficial enjoyment of
tidalwater resources. 22 The majority of the New Jersey Sports
Exposition court (the first sports complex case) remanded the cause
to the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority for further consideration in formal consultation with the Department of Environmental Protection and the Meadowlands Commission respecting the
ecological questions involved.'

23

In the second sports complex case,' 2 decided after Neptune
City, the supreme court determined that the Authority's findings
on certain of the environmental questions were not arbitrary and
should be sustained, Justice Hall concurring in the result. The
Authority had considered and made substantial program adjustments
respecting the impact of auto exhaust emissions on the area, the air,
and the public health, and called for continuing state agency "participation, primarily in the areas of solid waste disposal and recycling,
storm water disposal, sewage disposal, potable water supply, noise
abatement and air quality monitoring and control . .

21

The

impact of the mere presence of the physical plant on estuarine fishery reproduction, however, was not mentioned, presumably because it
was found to be negligible (not that the agency's continuing participation in this area, short of tearing down the structure and restoring
120. 61 N.J. at 36, 292 A.2d at 580, criticizing 119 N.J. Super. 457 at 492-95, 292 A.2d
580 at 615-18 (Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (Pashman, A.J.S.C.).
121. See id., and compare the opinion of the court per Hall, J. in Neptune City, 61 N.J.
at 301-04, 294 A.2d at 52-55. See also Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. 643-46, 696-710, citing,
inter alia, Hixon v. Public Service Commission, 32 Wis.2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966),
cited in Neptune City, id. at 304, 294 A.2d at 55.
122. Compare Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821) with Hixon v. Public Service
Commission, 32 Wis. 2d 608, 146 N.W.2d 577 (1966), approved in Neptune City v. AvonBy-The-Sea, 61 N.J. at 303-04, 294 A.2d at 54-55. This would follow from the premise of
the public trust doctrine, that the legislature is a mere trustee of tidalwater resources,
holding title for the common use and benefit of the people it represents: The trustees would
be disabled to impair, substantially, the corpus (in quality or quantity) and its power would
be limited by the purpose of the trust, efficient satisfaction of the citizenry's current
usufructuary demands. See also, infra note 126; 61 N.J. at 302-04,294 A.2d at 53-55.
123. These questions, much broader than those involving the public trust in tidalwater
resources, included air pollution and general public health.
124. In re Environmental Hearings on Proposed Sports Complex in the Hackensack
Meadowlands, 62 N.J. 248, 300 A.2d 337 (1973).
125. Id. at 252, 300 A.2d at 341.
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the marshland's natural state, would have any effect in any
event).

26

Two aspects of this case history should be noted: (a) the court
would not have vacated or supplanted the agency findings unless
they had been arbitrary;1 27 (b) the responsible agency was the
Sports and Exposition Authority, whose main (perhaps exclusive)
purpose 12 5 is construction of a sports exposition complex, not protection of estuarine life.
Deference to superior fact-finding resources in the technical fields
involved, rather than to naked quasi-legislative prerogative, may
explain the Sports Complex court's choice of standards. If so, its
decision does not conflict theoretically with this article's analysis of
Neptune City, that Neptune City implies the supreme court is willing
to invalidate any legislative or administrative tidalwater resource
allocation which substantially impairs 1 2 9 the citizenry's tidalwater
resource interests, notwithstanding contrary legislative or quasilegislative findings. Under this analysis of the Sports Complex decision, legislative findings would be "arbitrary," not "merely erroneous," when they threaten substantial, not merely de minimus,
impairment of public trust interests. This would explain Justice
Hall's concurrence in the result. As in most other trust relationships,
the trustee's (legislature's) judgment-respecting corpus conservation
and benefit maximization vis-a-vis current beneficiary demands and
future beneficiary rights-would be respected insofar as it did not
impair the corpus, allocate its use or distribute its benefits, contrary
to the purposes of the trust. The legislature is legally, politically and
practically better situated than the present court system to perceive
and satisfy legitimate trust benefit demand. But it is the business of
the judiciary to protect the beneficiary (citizenry) from actions of
the trustee (legislature) that impair the corpus or violate its natural
purposes. Thus, if at least one cogent argument indicated the sports
complex plan was threatening substantial impairment of common
fishery interests in New Jersey's estuaries, then the Sports Complex
court's decision either retracts Neptune City's dicta respecting the
126. But, since the public trust respecting tidalwaters arose because certain tidalwater
resources were by nature inappropriate for unnatural or concentrated allocation or necessary to common interests (see Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 596-99), privatization of

tidalmarsh which is appropriate for concentrated allocation and not necessary to common
interests would not violate the public trust. See id. at 606 n. 217.
127. The finding in question being "quasi4egislative," could not be overturned if
"merely erroneous" but only if arbitrary. 62 N.J. at 250, 300 A.2d at 339.
128. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:10-1 et seq. (1973).
129. See 61 N.J. at 303, 294 A.2d at 54, quoting Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
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limitations of legislative power under the tidalwater resource trust or
confines it to foreshore access allocation cases. Either way, it counters Neptune City's insinuation that the citizenry may obtain direct
court enforcement of the "deeply inherent" substantive rights recognized in Neptune City and Arnold v. Mundy,' 30 and not be relegated to the uncertain procedural "remedy" of "judicial indirection."' 3 Indeed, it would seem a violation of judicial duty under
Neptune City for the court to sanction a program affecting estuarine
marshland essential to New Jersey's coastal tidalwater fishery
designed upon the erroneous findings of an administrative agency
whose function is potentially inconsistent with the public trust in the
state's tidalwater resources.' 3 2
One answer is a special court, like those governing water resource
allocation in Western states.' 3 3 Such a court would have original and
prerogative jurisdiction over tidalwater resource allocation questions,
and would be composed of at least three judges, one skilled in a
relevant technological or scientific field and one with expertise in
economics. This court, empowered to entertain citizen suits, should
be established by constitutional amendment, but creation by legislation renouncing the supremacy of legislative findings would suffice.
Whatever its origin, the court should be independent of the legislature and executive, though subject to review by the supreme court.
Its orientation should be wholly judicial, and should be membership
appointed to minimize the influence of interests (like tidalwaterpolluting municipalities and industries) hostile to the public trust. Its
technological and economic expertise, as well as juristic skills, would
justify the primacy of its findings (even over legislative determinations) and its power to retry fact questions passed upon by administrative agencies acting upon tidalwater resources.
130. 6 N.J.L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821).
131. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 473, especially at 495 (1970). The article surveys judicial
techniques for precluding manifestation of legislative or administrative error in public water
resource allocation without "displacing" the legislative as ultimate decisionmaker in the
field. The techniques include remanding for further administrative action a program arguably inconsistent with ambiguous authorizing legislation. See also J. Sax, Defending the

Environment (1971).
132. In the second Sports Complex case, the Sports Exposition Authority's determination had comprehended results of investigations by the Department of Environmental Pro-

tection. 62 N.J. at 249, 300 A.2d at 338. Such input tends to indicate a trustworthy result.
But the Authority's conclusions may have influenced the Department of Environmental Protection, or the Department may have violated its trust. Compare supra note 27. See also
Note, 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 572, n. 6. If consequently the trust is threatened and the court
deems itself powerless to intercede, "public trust" is an empty term involving no citizen

rights after all.
133. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 148-21-1 et seq. (1969).
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The now-defunct New Jersey Senate bill No. 868 of June 8, 1970,
contemplated an "environmental protection court" with "original,
appellate and general jurisdiction throughout the State in all environmental protection causes," the appellate jurisdiction being "from any
municipal or county court or from any administrative body having
quasi-judicial powers." 134 But the standard of review seems the same
as that of the second Sports Complex case. Indeed, the absence of any
provision for appointment of members competent to make
"quasi-legislative" findings on technological scientific and economic
questions indicates such a constraint. 1 31 Perhaps, however, only
tidalwater resource allocation questions should receive the special
judicial treatment this article proposes. No public trust having been
recognized in the rest of the New Jersey environment, the state's
citizens can claim no inalienable, indefeasible property-like equities in
any but tidalwater interests. Their interests in the rest of their
environment, therefore, remain susceptible of legislative impairment.
It follows that imperfect legislative allocations of other public
resources are unreviewable, if they are not arbitrary. This situation may
be indicated by the scope and complexity of the New Jersey
environment above and beyond the tides, where few resources have
essentially public, naturally circumscribed utilities.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Neptune City apparently announces recognition by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey that its 1821 decision in Arnold v. Mundy
established an inalienable, indefeasible equitable property in the citizens of New Jersey respecting the state's tidalwater resources. This
interest, whose legal title is held in trust for the public by the legislature, seems to be cognizable at the suit of individual citizens qua
citizens. Expansive or protean, though principally related to navigation, fishing and attendant interests, the public trust is defined by
actual citizenry demand. Thus, presently the trust comprehends the
rights of sea-bathing and foreshore and tidelands recreation, and precludes discrimination in its regulation. This public trust also appears
134. Compare supra note 27 (Emphasis added).
135. Compare Assembly #569 (1972) which provides no special court but may contemplate broader review of administrative findings. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying
text.
Revisionary note: As this article went to press, State Senator Dodd introduced bill #169
(1974), which substantially resurrects Senate #868 of 1970, and, like 868, neither provides
for a special state water resource court nor requires technological or economics expertise of
the judges. Neither bill, however, would prevent appointment of such experts if they also
had practiced law in New Jersey for ten years, assuming two or more such doubly qualified
individuals exist.
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to be beyond legislative prerogative. Citizens accordingly would seem
entitled to judicial review of legislative allocations of tidalwater
resources, review even of relevant legislative findings and policies.
Beneath these apparent contours, Neptune City bears many muscular problems. They include: (a) the geographical limits of the trust,
(b) its relation to federal powers and the Constitutional rights of
federal citizens not domiciled in New Jersey, (c) the validity of legislative allocations of tidalwater resources to nonresident or extraterritorial use, (d) the efficiency and propriety of local regulation of
citizen tidalwater resource enjoyment, and (e) the appropriate definition and administration of citizens' remedies for violations of the
trust.
Respecting citizens' remedies, stubbornest of the problems, the
answer should be a special tidalwater resource allocation court with
relevant technological, scientific, and economics expertise as well as
juridical competence, and with power to review legislative and quasilegislative findings. Otherwise, Neptune City may be too little too
late to protect the "deeply inherent right"' ' 6 of New Jersey citizens
in their "very scarce" and important' ' I tidalwater resources.

136. 61 N.J.at 303,294 A.2dat 53.
137. Id.; cf. New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority v. McCrane, 61 N.J. 1 at 55, 292
A.2d 545 at 579 (1972) (Hall, J., dissenting).

